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Introduction 
The need for accounting to provide information about social costs and bene-
fits has recently received increased attention.1 Evidently, whether accounting 
information should reflect social values (costs and benefits) as well as private 
values depends on what the objectives of accounting are. th is paper dis-
cusses the justification for including information about social values in 
accounting reports. Necessarily, such a justification, if accepted, implies the 
desirability of broadly defining accounting objectives to include the goals 
that measurements of social values are intended to satisfy. 
The objectives of accounting could be broadly defined to include the 
promotion of an optimal allocation of resources, or even equity or welfare 
considerations, or they could be restricted to private considerations. In the 
latter case, prescriptions about accounting principles and standards will only 
consider events that facilitate maximization of the wealth of the firm's share-
holders. Such a set of prescriptions may not facilitate the achievement of 
optimal allocation of resources within the economy or the maximization of 
social welfare. 
Loosely speaking, when the actions of the firm affect only its own costs 
and benefits, there is no divergence between private values and social 
values,2 and thus the decisions and actions taken in pursuit of the firm's own 
1 Churchil l, et al., for example, claim: "More than ever before, what one organiza-
tion does affects other organizations and society as a whole. Information regarding 
social and private costs, as well as social and private benefits, is badly needed." 
[See Neil C. Churchil l, Joshua Ronen, Robert J. Sack, George H. Sorter, and Robert 
M. Trueblood, Information for Proprietors and Others, Prepared for the Tenth Interna-
tional Congress of Accountants (Touche Ross & Co.: October 1972).] 
2 The discussion is initially restricted to the case of externalities caused by a firm 
in the sense that its activity affects the value of a production function or of a con-
sumption function of other entities directly (i.e., via the arguments of such functions). 
For an elaboration of the definition of an externality, see E. J. Mishan, "The Postwar 
Literature on Externalities: An Interpretative Essay," Journal of Economic Literature 
(March 1971), p. 2, who restricts the term to cases where the effect produced " is 
not a deliberate creation but an unintended or incidental product of some otherwise 
legitimate activity." 
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interests will result in the optimization of both. However, when the actions of 
an individual firm do affect other firms' or individuals' actions, then pursuing 
only private benefits may not result in the optimization of social benefits or 
in an economy-wide efficient allocation of resources. In this case, an ac-
counting objective that is restricted to the consideration of private benefits 
and costs may require the communication of data that will not meet the 
social objectives. 
The emphasis on the word "may" was deliberate. It is possible that 
private profit maximization by a firm will also bring about an efficient allo-
cation of resources even when the firm's actions directly affect3 the other 
firms' actions. This would be the case when the firm takes into account 
explicitly these effects before it makes its decisions. In fact, to maximize its 
profits, the firm must consider the effects of its actions on other firms or 
individuals unless such consideration is, in itself, too costly. These effects 
fall within the normal economic definition of opportunity costs and should, 
therefore, be explicitly considered along with other costs in making rational 
decisions.4 Inasmuch as these opportunity costs are relevant inputs to deci-
sions that lead to the maximization of both private and social values, the 
benefits of systematically incorporating them in accounting information are 
clearly positive. The problem is to ascertain whether these benefits exceed 
the costs of including opportunity costs in accounting reports. 
The issue becomes more complex when the effects of a firm's actions 
on others are not or cannot be taken into consideration when making deci-
sions within the firm. This would be the case when the price mechanism of 
the market—which enables the firms to consider such facts explicitly in their 
decisions—either does not exist or is too costly. Operationally, this means 
that transaction costs such as conducting negotiations, drawing up contracts 
and inspecting are higher than the benefits of adjusting the firm's actions on 
the basis of the expected effects of these actions on other entities. In this 
case, pursuing private interests will not lead the firm to bring about a socially 
desirable allocation of resources, and governmental intervention through the 
legal determination of rights, regulations, policing, etc., may eventually be-
come desirable.5 Should the accounting objective in such cases include a 
quantification of the social effects, and, if so, how would such effects be 
measured in the absence of a smoothly operating price mechanism? 
Illustration With a Simple Case of Two Producers 
It would probably be best to deal with the above question in the simple 
case of one producer who directly and adversely affects another producer's 
3 In the sense of the externality definition, see footnote 2. 
4 The economic definition of costs refers only to opportunity costs. See, for example, 
George J. Stigler, Theory of Price, 3d ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1966), pp. 104-110. 
5 For a lucid discussion of this issue, see R. H. Coase, "The Problem of Social 
Cost," Journal of Law and Economics (October 1960), pp. 1-44. 
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output through engaging in a diseconomy-producing activity.6 
To illustrate, suppose that a machine shop, A, produces noise that brings 
about an increase in the number of defective devices produced by B, a 
neighboring manufacturer of highly specialized precision-electronic instru-
ments. B's loss resulting from the noise interfering with the skilled workers' 
ability to perform is $400 per month, while his profit in the absence of dam-
age amounts to $300 per month. A's profit from operations amounts to $350 
per month. A noise stifling device could be installed in the machines to 
eliminate the damage to B; this would cost A $250 monthly. 
Clearly, from a social viewpoint, A should continue its operations, since 
the value of its production ($350) exceeds the cost of eliminating the damage 
to B. Given that A and B can get together and bargain, the socially desirable 
solution (with A continuing its operations) will prevail irrespective of whether 
A is legally liable to pay damages to B. If A is liable to B, the corrective 
device will be installed. It would be more profitable for A to incur the $250 
monthly cost rather than produce the noise and pay $400. A's actual profit 
will be reduced from $350 to $100. The $250 are actual costs for A incurred 
to preclude the adverse effects of its operations on B. 
If B cannot sue A, a feasible alternative might be to pay A an amount not 
in excess of $300 (B's profit) to terminate operations. B would attempt to pay 
no more than $250 per month, the cost of installing a noise-stifling device. 
The exact payment will depend on B's bargaining power in relation to A. The 
$250 payment passed up (assuming that this will be the agreed-upon pay-
ment) is an opportunity cost to A, and its profits are $100: $350 from opera-
tions minus the opportunity costs of $250.7 The $100 is also A's eventual 
contribution to the social product, i.e., the value of its production ($350) 
reduced by the value of resources needed for the corrective device ($250) 
6 Certainly, this is only one of many business situations in which social costs and 
benefits can be incurred. The standard example of social costs which is typical 
of the two-producers situation is the case of the factory emitting smoke which has 
harmful effects on those occupying neighboring properties. An example of social 
benefits would be the training by a firm of its employees which benefits future 
potential employers of the trained personnel. Some social costs can be easily quan-
tifiable through the operation of a smooth market price mechanism. Other social 
costs are very difficult to quantify. Examples of the latter include the effect of noise 
or fumes caused by a factory on the health and satisfaction of the neighborhood 
residents, the benefit rendered to society through conducting educational and recrea-
tional programs by a firm, etc. Social costs are easier to quantify when the action 
of a firm affects the product of another firm. Situations like this give rise to what is 
usually known as "external economies" and "d iseconomies." But while social costs 
and benefits are more dif f icult—and therefore more cost ly—to quantify than in other 
situations, the type of analysis that justifies their quantification is similar to the one 
employed in the simple case discussed above. 
7 In any case, $250 will be the minimum opportunity cost. Since this is the only 
possible opportunity cost magnitude known with certainty to A, it is suggested as A's 
measure of opportunity cost. 
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which A will eventually install (as a result of bargaining with B), thus pre-
cluding alternative use of the resources elsewhere in the economy. 
Naturally, if the cost to A and B of reaching an agreement and enforcing 
it is more than the benefit of doing so (in this case $300) and if A is not liable 
to B, no agreement will be reached. B will terminate its operations, and the 
social product will decrease by $300. This may still be the better alternative 
(since transaction costs would have decreased the social product by even 
more) unless the government could, at a cost less than $300 per month 
(either through establishing a liability for damage or by a tax subsidy system), 
induce B to resume operations and A to install the noise-stifling device. 
The Role of Opportunity Costs 
As the above illustration demonstrates, the resource allocation is op-
timal regardless of whether the harmed party has the right to bring an action 
for damages, as long as opportunity costs are appropriately considered. To 
avoid inflicting the damage, A could increase its precautions by either in-
stalling the device or moving to another location. Either action could poten-
tially increase A's costs. In this illustration it was assumed that installation 
of the device was the least costly means of preventing the damage. Alter-
natively, A could pay for the damage. This would be done if the payments 
for damage were less than the additional costs that would have to be in-
curred to avoid the damage. In that case, the payments for damage would 
become part of the cost of manufacturing A's product. It may be possible 
that the damage could be prevented by some action on the part of B. If B's 
additional cost, in this case, is less than the amount of damage that would 
otherwise occur, it should be possible for a mutually satisfactory bargain to 
be struck by A and B. If B would have had to suffer the damage without 
compensation, the allocation of resources would not have been affected. 
Since B would be willing to pay an amount up to its loss of income to induce 
A to discontinue production, this loss of income would become a part of A's 
costs. 
Thus, in order to achieve an optimal allocation of resources, it is desir-
able that both parties consider the harmful effects in deciding on their courses 
of action. When opportunity costs are explicitly considered, the fall in the 
value of production due to the harmful effects would be a cost for both 
parties. 
Accounting information should reflect these social costs since they are 
legitimate and true costs of production for each of the two manufacturers. 
The harm which was done by A to B is a joint result of the actions of both 
parties. The increase in the number of defective devices was caused by 
noise produced in A's machine shop, but no damage would have occurred 
if B had not chosen to engage in a highly specialized and delicate activity 
that made its workers highly sensitive to noise and easily affected by it. Both 
parties caused the damage. Both should treat the harm as part of their costs. 
If accounting information is to reflect the costs of production, and if it is 
to reflect the resulting income so that the latter gives the proper indication 
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of the quality of management performance, these costs should be a part of 
accounting information. Reflecting such opportunity costs makes it possible 
for accounting report users to properly assess managerial performance, in-
asmuch as managers have to choose the best actions possible for the firm. 
But, in addition, if income figures that result from past actual transactions are 
deemed to be at all important (both in providing a record of actual past 
transactions to fulfill the stewardship function of accounting and in providing 
the means to validate past managerial expectations), it is evident that these 
opportunity costs should be treated as production costs. 
The fortunate fact that the independent actions of the parties—in pursuit 
of their own self interests (with or without predetermination of a legal right to 
impose payment for damages)—led to optimal allocation of resources was 
facilitated by a market mechanism in which transaction costs are not too 
high. A market transaction involves costly activities such as drawing up a 
contract and enforcing it. These operations can be costly to the extent that 
they may preclude some transactions that would have been carried out in a 
world in which the pricing system was costless. Once the costs of carrying 
out market transactions are taken into account, it is clear that such compen-
sating transactions would only be undertaken when the increase in the value 
of production resulting from the transactions is greater than the cost of the 
transactions. In other situations, in which transaction costs are high, such 
as the standard case of smoke nuisance which may affect a vast number of 
people engaged in a wide variety of activities, the prohibitive administrative 
cost might make impossible any attempt to deal with the problem within the 
individual firm. An alternative solution to establishment of legal rights would 
be direct governmental regulation. Instead of a legal system of rights that is 
modifiable by market transactions, the government may impose direct regu-
lation. Because of its power, the government may be able to bring about 
corrective actions at a lower cost than that of a private organization. And 
although governmental action can be extremely costly, it may be the only 
alternative to private action. 
What are the implications for accounting objectives, in the case of high 
transaction costs, which may make governmental intervention necessary or 
desirable? There are two reasons, in addition to those stated for the case 
where transaction costs were not high, why the gathering and communication 
of information about social costs are desirable even in the absence of a 
potential solution on the private level. The first is that the communication of 
such information may (subject to the determination that such information is 
best processed by the firm creating the externality) lead to the proper kind 
of governmental intervention that achieves efficient allocation of resources. 
Disclosure of such information should be helpful in determining which of the 
alternative social arrangements is optimal for dealing with externality. An 
additional reason for reporting such information rests upon the ultimate 
benefit to the private user. Assume that an efficient market will eventually 
lead to desirable social action. In this case, the communication of informa-
tion about the cost to the firm, that will probably be associated with whatever 
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social arrangement emerges, will enable users of financial statements to 
appraise the future prospects of the firm. The importance of providing data 
on social costs to make possible the carrying out of an appropriate policy 
that minimizes resource misallocation will become much clearer when the 
social-cost problem is viewed as isomorphic to the problem of transfer 
pricing. 
The Social Cost Problem Viewed in 
A Transfer Pricing Context 
Careful analysis of the problem of social costs reveals striking similari-
ties to that of transfer pricing within an individual decentralized firm. The 
problem of divergencies between social costs and private costs is the 
counterpart of the transfer pricing problem at the total economy level. 
At the individual firm level, decentralization through use of the profit 
center concept is motivated by several factors. Among these are the divi-
sion's nearness to the marketplace which provides the local managers with 
relevant information regarding changes in the prices of inputs and outputs, 
and more effective coordination of factors of production that can be obtained 
locally at the divisional level.8 The need to establish the proper system of 
transfer prices for decentralized profit centers is predicated primarily upon 
three requirements.9 First, the transfer prices must enable central manage-
ment to evaluate as accurately as possible the performance of the profit 
centers in terms of their separate contributions to corporate profits. Second, 
the system of transfer pricing must motivate profit center managers to pursue 
their own self-interests in a manner which is conducive to the success of the 
company as a whole. And, third, the system must serve as a stimulus to 
managers to increase their efficiency without restricting the autonomy of the 
divisions as profit centers. With respect to the objectives of accounting re-
ports, as related to the first of these requirements, Ronen and McKinney10 
commented: 
One of the main functions of accounting reports is to facilitate the 
evaluation of the profitability of various segments of the firm. This 
8 See the fol lowing: 
Paul W. Cook, "Decentral ization and the Transfer-Price Problem," Journal of Business 
(April 1955), pp. 87-94. 
J. R. Gould, "Internal Pricing in Firms When There Are Costs of Using an Outside 
Market," Journal of Business (January 1964), pp. 61-67. 
Jack Hirshleifer, "On the Economics of Transfer Pricing," Journal of Business (July 
1956), pp. 72-84, and "Economics of the Divisionalized Firm," Journal of Business 
(April 1957), pp. 96-100. 
Joshua Ronen, and George McKinney III, "Transfer Pricing for Divisional Autonomy," 
Journal of Accounting Research (Spring 1970), pp. 99-112. 
David Solomons, Divisional Performance: Measurement and Control (Financial Execu-
tives Research Foundation, 1965). 
9 See Ronen and McKinney, "Transfer Pricing for Divisional Autonomy," pp. 99-100. 
10 Ibid., p. 100. 
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same objective lies at the root of divisionalization. Paradoxically, 
however, when profit and loss reports are based on a typical set of 
transfer prices, they do not reflect the amount which profit center 
activities contribute to the pool of corporate profits. . . . Reflecting 
these contributions is not only important to the manager of the con-
tributing division, but also to central management who evaluates the 
division's profitability and decides whether to continue or abandon 
them. 
A series of substitutions in this quotation renders it an appropriate represen-
tation of the problem of social costs. After modification, the quotation reads 
as follows: 
One of the main functions of accounting reports is to facilitate the 
evaluation of the profitability of various segments of the economy. 
This same objective lies at the root of decentralizing the economy 
into firms. Paradoxically, however, when profit and loss reports are 
based on only market prices established through market transac-
tions, they do not reflect the amount which the firm's activities con-
tribute to the pool of the economy's increment in wealth. . . . 
Reflecting these contributions is not only important to the manager 
of the contributing firm, but also to the government that evaluates 
the firm's activities and decides on the appropriate measures re-
garding activities which are socially harmful. 
Thus, the similarity is striking—the same economic cost and benefit 
evaluations underlie the centralization/decentralization decisions within a 
firm and the centralization/decentralization decisions within the economy as 
a whole. For example, Coase argues thus:11 
It is clear that an alternative form of economic organization which 
could achieve the same result at less cost than would be incurred 
by using the market should be used whenever it would enable the 
value of production to be raised . . . within the firm individual bar-
gains between the various cooperating factors of production are 
eliminated and for market transaction is substituted an administra-
tive decision. The rearrangement of production then takes place 
without the need for bargains between the owners of the factors of 
production. . . . The firm would acquire the legal rights of all the 
parties and the rearrangement activities would not follow on a 
rearrangement of rights by contract, but as a result of an admin-
istrative decision as to how the rights should be used. . . . The 
government is in a sense a super firm since it is able to influence 
the use of factors of production by administrative decision. 
But as is the case when 
11 "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics (October 1960), 
pp. 16-17; see also Coase, "The Nature of the Firm," Economica (New Series, 1937). 
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. . . the administrative costs of organizing transactions within the 
firm may also be high, and particularly so when many diverse activi-
ties are brought within the control of a single organization . . . the 
governmental administrative machine is not in itself costless. . . . 
[and] . . . direct governmental regulation will not necessarily give 
better results than leaving the problem to be solved by the market 
or the firm. But equally, there is no reason why, on occasion, such 
governmental administrative regulations should not lead to improve-
ments in economic efficiency. 
It is these high administrative costs of organizing transactions within the 
firm when operations are centralized or within the economy where the gov-
ernment extensively intervenes that induces a firm, among other things, to 
decentralize and the government to let the free market mechanism bring 
about a desirable equilibrium. But at the same time, decentralization may 
lead to less than optimal value accumulation whenever there are inter-
dependencies among the autonomous units. 
Thus, at the individual firm level where the profit centers or the divisions 
are not economically independent, as would be the case whenever the ex-
ternal market for the intermediate product which is transferred from one 
division to the other is not perfectly competitive, decisions taken by the 
autonomous profit centers in pursuit of their self interest will likely be most 
dysfunctional from the standpoint of the profitability of the firm as a whole. 
Analogously, at the economy level, decentralization may lead—whenever 
there are producers' interdependencies—to a less-than-optimal social prod-
uct if the individual firms are left to pursue their own self interests through 
maximizing private profits when these diverge from social profits. Dysfunc-
tional decisions that result from decentralization within a firm can be avoided 
by recentralization wherein relevant economic decisions (production proc-
esses, prices, etc.) are made by central management. Similarly, at the level 
of the economy as a whole, it is necessary to completely integrate all industry 
to eliminate all divergence between private profits and public benefits.12 
Thus, profits of firms in a market economy may not lead to economic opti-
mum and, the more decentralized and differentiated the economy, the less 
they are a guide to such optimum. Would centralization—whether at the firm 
or the economy level—be the only solution to suboptimal decisions caused 
by decentralization? 
As indicated, central decision-making by a firm engaging in a diverse 
range of activities can be costly as can be governmental administrative regu-
lation. And, in any particular instance, it must be ascertained whether the 
gain that would come from regulating action that gives rise to harmful effects 
12 Thus, Rodan Rosenstein advocated that " the whole of the industry to be created 
is to be treated and planned like one huge firm or trust." ["Problems of Industrializa-
tion of Eastern and South Eastern Europe," Economic Journal (1943), p. 204.] 
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would be higher than the cost involved in governmental regulation. There are 
alternatives, and the problem becomes one of choosing the appropriate and 
least costly social arrangement for dealing with harmful effects, whether at 
the firm or the economy level. Since the alternative schemes that were 
suggested to deal with the social effects problem are similar to those that 
are discussed in the context of transfer pricing at the individual firm level, it 
should be useful to review and juxtapose these schemes. 
The need for information to be reported by a division in a decentralized 
firm on its contribution to the firm's overall profits—to facilitate continuance-
abandonment decisions—has long been established in the accounting litera-
ture. So did the need for incorporating in the accounting information data 
that made possible the determination of the optimal transfer pricing rules 
(optimal in the sense of inducing goal-congruent decisions by the profit 
centers without adversely affecting their autonomy). In a similar fashion, at 
the economy level, firms should communicate information that facilitates and 
makes possible the determination of the best social arrangement that should 
be effected to deal with externalities (unless this information is more cheaply 
provided by other sources). Information should also be provided about the 
contribution of any individual firm to the social product as a whole. While 
these individual contributions may not equal the total social product, they 
constitute a valuable guide to decisions taken on an economy-wide level 
concerning the encouragement of some economic activities within the econ-
omy and the discouragement of others. 
Indeed, the objectives of accounting cannot end at the individual firm 
level just as reporting requirements within a firm are not exhausted by de-
fining the individual profit center's needs. Accounting should consider the 
repercussions of the firm's actions on others. As in the case of a decentral-
ized firm, it should consider the repercussions of the actions of an individual 
profit center on other profit centers and thus on the profits of the firm as a 
whole. 
The Alternative Solutions to the Problem of Interdependencies. There 
are a number of possible social arrangements dealing with the problem of 
"side" effects.13 The choice of the best social arrangement naturally depends 
on the evaluation of costs and benefits associated with the arrangement. No 
particular arrangement can be said a priori to be superior to others. Rather, 
careful examination of the circumstances of any particular case is necessary. 
For example, as shown by Coase,14 if the party imposing harmful effects and 
the party suffering them are able and willing to negotiate to their mutual 
13 The term "side effects" was used by Harold Demsetz ["The Exchange and 
Enforcement of Property Rights," Journal of Law and Economics (October 1964), 
pp. 11-26] rather than either "external effects" or "neighborhood effects" to avoid 
the connotations implied by these terms, 
14 In "The Problem of Social Cost." 
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advantage, governmental intervention is unnecessary in order to bring about 
the most efficient resource allocation. Thus, the imposition of a tax on the 
party imposing the harmful side effects could be a very complicated matter 
even in principle, and any prior prescription of such a tax may be unwise. 
Other alternatives are available; their advisability depends on the costs 
of effecting and policing them. These include outright government regulation 
establishing zoning rules, for example, extension of the role of the firm 
through integrating the entities affected by the diseconomy-creating activity,15 
the solution that combines the extension of the firm with combination-sale 
devices.16 Demsetz17 argues that devices like these can extend the useful-
ness of markets for revealing and measuring the value of side effects. For 
this solution (combination-sale) to be feasible, of course, the resulting under-
specialization cost should not exceed the reduction in exchange and policing 
costs (created by the solution). Finally, it may be that the market solutions 
are too costly, and the most efficient alternative is to disregard and not to 
take into account some external or side effects. 
All of the above solutions apply with some slight modification to the 
problem of ensuring efficient resource allocation among the profit centers of 
a decentralized firm. 
An attempt is made below to show how the standard economic analysis 
necessary to determine the optimal amount of externality to be produced is 
identical in the two situations, i.e., the transfer pricing and the social cost 
situations. In fact, the harmful side effect imposed by one firm on others 
which causes divergence between social costs and private costs corresponds 
to a "noxious" intermediate product that is transferred from one division to 
another within a decentralized firm in the context of transfer pricing. This 
standard economic analysis is appropriate when exchange costs are not too 
high so that the optimal allocation of resources is brought about through 
mutual exchange between the parties affected. 
As indicated earlier, when transaction costs are too high, other solutions 
may be preferable, such as governmental regulation and taxation. However, 
to ascertain which social alternative arrangement is preferable, it is essential, 
first, to apply the standard economic analysis in order to evaluate explicitly 
the benefits of engaging in exchange as opposed to the cost of exchange 
and thus to compare the alternative of exchange with other social arrange-
ments. The economic aspects of the exchange are discussed first. Once the 
identity of the analysis between the individual firm and the economy is estab-
lished, a discussion of the information requirements needed to bring about a 
necessary exchange or to make possible the valuation of the advisability of 
an exchange in the transfer pricing context is presented after which the 
15 See Coase, "The Nature of the Firm." 
16 See Demsetz, "Exchange and Enforcement of Property Rights." 
17 Ibid. 
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nature of the information requirements in the social cost context is con-
sidered. 18 
Inevitably, the information requirements will be very similar. The same 
reasons that justify the communication within accounting reports of informa-
tion that facilitates the proper transfer pricing system call for the communi-
cation within accounting reports of information that makes possible the choice 
of the social arrangement that is necessary to deal with the divergence be-
tween social costs and private costs. 
The Economic Analysis in the 
Transfer-Pricing Context 
The discussion which follows is based on the analysis in Ronen and 
McKinney.19 For the purpose of the discussion, assume a simple case of a 
decentralized firm with two divisions, with no loss of generality: a manufac-
turing division and a distribution division. The manufacturing division trans-
fers some intermediate product to the distribution division. The distribution 
division sells the final product to the outside market. 
To simplify the analysis, it is assumed that the divisions are technologi-
cally independent; i.e., the level of production in one division does not affect 
the cost of the other. It is also assumed that a common level of output is to be 
reached by the two divisions (either because there exists no market for the 
intermediate product or because the marginal costs of either division rise 
sharply when dealing with an outside market). 
To assure optimal profits for the firm as a whole without unduly restrict-
ing the autonomy of divisional managers,20 it was suggested (see Figures 1 
and 2, page 328) that the manufacturing division communicate to central 
management its marginal cost curve, MMC, by stating how much it would 
produce at various transfer prices. From this, central management derives the 
18 Indeed, the problem of providing information that facilitates the choice of an 
appropriate policy is of primary importance as argued by Harold Demsetz in "Some 
Aspects of Property Rights," Journal of Law and Economics IX (October 1966), p. 
68: 
The costs and benefits of a prospective change in resource allocation 
cannot be treated as given datum. The marginal cost and benefit curves 
associated with a prospective realignment of resources are not known by 
the government. Each affected individual knows his benefits or costs, and, 
in the absence of high exchange cost, this information would be transmitted 
to others in the form of market negotiations. The primary problem of the 
government is the estimation problem. The compensation principle by its 
assumption that costs and benefits are known begs the most difficult question 
posed by a prospective change. 
19 "Transfer Pricing for Divisional Autonomy," pp. 103-105. 
20 In that they are not permitted to act as monopolistic buyers or sellers where a 
perfectly competitive market for the intermediate product does not exist externally. 
See Hirshleifer, "On the Economics of Transfer Pricing." 
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Figure 1 MANUFACTURING DIVISION 
Figure 2 
average cost function which is then given to the distribution division designat-
ing P1(Q) the actual transfer price it will be charged for alternative quantities. 
Similarly, central management obtains from the distribution division its 
demand schedule showing how much that division would purchase at various 
transfer prices (this equals the marginal revenue from the sale of the first 
product, MR, less the marginal distribution cost, MDC). From this, an average 
revenue function (which is the final product demand, D, less average dis-
tribution cost, ADC) is given to the manufacturing division as its demand 
schedule designating P*(Q) the transfer price offered to the manufacturing 
division for any quantity supplied. The distribution division is charged P1(Q*) 
for any quantity (Q*) transferred. The manufacturing unit is credited with 
P*(Q*) per unit, consisting of the payment from the distribution division, 
plus a subsidy from central management of [P*(Q*) — P 1 Q*) ] • Q*. 
When the manufacturing unit faces the (D — ADC) curve as its demand 
curve, it derives the curve marginal to it (MR — MDC), and chooses to pro-
duce the quantity optimal for the firm Q* where MMC = MR — MDT. 
Through a similar process, the distribution division will choose the same level 
of output. Thus both divisions will want to produce at the same level and will 
maximize their own profits as well as the firm's in doing so. Furthermore, a 
division's reported profit equals its contribution to the firm's profit, i.e., the 
amount by which the firm's profit would be reduced if the division were aban-
doned. (In this simple case, divisional contributions to the firm's profit is 
identical to the total firm's profit.) 
As shown above, through a tax and/or subsidy system applied to 
divisions of the decentralized firm, divisional managers could be induced to 
make decisions which maximize the firm's profit without unduly restricting 
their autonomy. Also, divisional profits would reflect divisional contributions 
to the firm's profits as a whole. 
What are the informational requirements of such a system and their 
implications for accounting? The divisions must communicate information 
about their cost and demand functions. While this, at first, may seem com-
plicated, it should be remembered that the same information is also essential 
for divisional management to make informed decisions. The only further 
requirement is to make this information explicit. Probably, the benefit (i.e., 
enabling central management to effect a policy whereby the divisions' actions 
in their own self-interest do not adversely affect the firm's profit as a whole) 
of incorporating such information explicitly rather than implicitly exceeds the 
cost of communicating such information explicitly and systematically. Notice 
that the function of central management is restricted, in the above system, 
to transferring information between the divisions. The divisions themselves 
are allowed to adapt continuously to changing environmental conditions; 
changing cost conditions need only be periodically reported to central man-
agement. In the absence of an intermediate market which would allow 
transactions to be conducted directly between the two divisions, it was 
thus shown that an intervention by central management (which would hope-
fully be conducted with minimal interference with the divisions' autonomy) 
may be appropriate and desirable. 
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Whether accounting should systematically communicate to central man-
agement the information essential for such desirable intervention depends 
on whether the benefits of intervention (which consist of eliminating the 
reduction in the firm's profits that result from dysfunctional decisions by 
the divisions in pursuit of their self-interests) exceed the cost of incorpo-
rating such information in accounting, communicating it, and processing it 
by a central management in order to effect the appropriate transfer pricing 
policy. Within the context of transfer pricing, as discussed above, it appears 
obvious that the benefits exceed the cost and that the necessary information 
should, therefore, be incorporated in accounting reports on a systematic and 
periodic basis. Moreover, the similarities between the transfer pricing problem 
and the social cost problem justify the conclusion that the benefits of incorpo-
rating information about social costs within accounting reports also exceed 
the costs of doing so. 
The Economic Analysis of the 
Social Cost Problem 
To illustrate the analysis of the social cost problem, two entities, A and 
B, are assumed, although the conclusion would be applicable to any number 
of entities. A engages in a diseconomy creating a harmful activity, thus 
causing damages to B. The magnitude of the damage naturally depends 
not only on the scale of A's activity but also on the way B adjusts to it. In 
fact, knowledge about the alternative activities open to both A and B with 
respect to the harmful effect is necessary to determine the optimal allocation 
of resources. Evidently the optimal allocation of resources is obtained when 
A's gain from the harmful activity less B's loss resulting from it is maximized, 
after all alternatives are considered, including discontinuance of the harmful 
activity. 
Suppose that A and B are firms, then the effects that the harmful activity 
has on their profits measure their gains or losses. In addition, assuming no 
serious market imperfections, these changes in profits would be the appro-
priate basis for the determination of a social optimum. If it is also assumed 
that each firm, in pursuit of its own self-interest, seeks to maximize profits 
and that each knows about the available alternative activity and is willing to 
negotiate, then both will achieve the optimum without governmental inter-
vention. They will either merge and internalize the harmful activity, or they 
will reach the desired level of activity by having B pay A to modify the nature 
or scale of its harmful activity. When there is liability for damage, A will 
compensate B for the optimal amount of damage imposed by A. All these 
solutions are parallel to those applicable to the transfer-pricing case between 
two divisions of a decentralized firm if these divisions were free to merge, 
to agree on a mutually optimal transfer price for the intermediate product or if 
central management were to force A to pay B the amount of optimal loss 
imposed as a "transfer price" for the noxious "intermediate product" trans-
ferred, respectively. Thus, central management can (in the transfer pricing 
case) specify the quantity of the intermediate product to be manufactured 
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and transferred or apply a dual tax-subsidy system to avoid suboptimization.21 
But similarly the government may appropriately intervene in the social cost 
case and regulate the nature and the scale of the harmful activity or apply a 
corrective tax-subsidy system. However, there are dissimilarities between 
the social tax-subsidy solution as traditionally known, and the transfer pricing 
system described above. 
According to the traditional tax-subsidy solution at the social level, the 
required excise tax for a good generating an external diseconomy is equal 
to the value of the marginal diseconomy at the optimal output, whereas the 
excise subsidy should equal the value of the marginal external economy at 
the optimal output for a socially beneficial good. But these measures are 
dysfunctional in that the suggested tax will reduce output below its competitive 
equilibrium, and the subsidy will extend output beyond the optimal level.22 
A related objection to the excise tax-subsidy solution is raised in a paper 
by P. Bohm23 as quoted by Mishan:24 
If the optimal excise tax increases with output, the firm (he argues) 
might become aware of the relationship. Subtracting the schedule 
of optimal taxes from the demand price of the product would result 
in a downward-sloping net average revenue curve from which the 
firm could derive a marginal revenue curve. By equating marginal 
cost to this "marginal revenue" curve, the firm reduces its output 
below optimal. 
However, the government is not obliged to impose a uniform dis-
criminating tax, one equal at each unit of output to the marginal 
effluent and, therefore, at any output raising a total tax equal to the 
total loss inflicted by the effluent. Such a tax, already marginal, 
effectively precludes the industry from "exploiting" it by reducing 
its output. In addition, such a discriminating tax ensures that the 
total conditions are met. Thus, heavy effluent charges properly 
imposed on the initial units of the output could well prohibit pro-
duction of the good. 
It is interesting to notice the striking similarity between Bohm's sug-
gestion at the social level and Hirshleifer's25 solution for the transfer pricing 
problem in that divisional managers are not permitted to act as monopolistic 
21 See Ronen and McKinney, "Transfer Pricing for Divisional Autonomy," pp. 
99-112. 
22 For a discussion of this issue, see Mishan, "The Postwar Literature on Exter-
nalit ies," pp. 1-28; J. M. Buchanan and W. C. Stubblebine, "Externali ty," Economica, 
XXIX (November 1962), pp. 371-384; and Ralph Turvey, "On Divergencies Between 
Social Cost and Private Cost," Economica (August 1963), pp. 309-313. 
23 P. Bohm, "Pollution, Purification and the Theory of External Effects" (mimeo-
graphed, 1969). 
24 "The Postwar Literature on Externalities," pp. 15-16. 
25 "On the Economics of Transfer Pricing." 
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buyers or sellers where a perfectly competitive market for the intermediate 
product does not exist externally. Unfortunately, this solution, for both trans-
fer pricing and the social cost problem, may unduly restrict the autonomy 
of the manager (of the division and the firm, respectively). In addition, it does 
not provide information about the contribution (of the division and of the firm) 
to the overall profits (of the firm as a whole and of the economy, respec-
tively).26 
It can be shown, however, that the dual tax-subsidy solution suggested 
by Ronen and McKinney27 for the transfer-pricing problem, as discussed 
above, can apply to the social cost case as illustrated in the figures below. 
Figure 3, opposite, illustrates the situation faced by A. The scale of the 
harmful activity conducted by A, as represented by the horizontal axis, and 
the scale of B's losses resulting from the activity, as represented in Figure 4, 
opposite, are assumed to be continuously variable. In Figure 3, the line MG(A) 
represents the marginal gain to A from the harmful activity. This is simply 
the net gain that results from producing the goods and services which neces-
sitate engaging in a harmful activity. Thus, this line reflects the revenue 
minus all the costs (including the private costs of the harmful activity) related 
to the product which creates the harmful activity to B. The area under this 
line gives the total gain to A from the harmful activity. The line ML(B) in 
Figure 4 represents the marginal loss to B from the harmful activity of A. 
This is the marginal reduction in profit resulting from the side effects of A's 
activity. The total area under this line reflects the total loss to B after making 
the best possible adjustment to A's activity. It is, therefore, the direct loss 
as reduced by adjustment plus the cost of making that adjustment. If A and 
B cannot negotiate and if no restrictions whatever are imposed on A, A would 
choose to engage in the harmful activity at a level OC. Clearly, the optimal 
level for the activity from the social standpoint is OD, which would be obtained 
if A and B could merge, as illustrated in Figure 5, page 334. When the opti-
mum level of the activity OD is produced, the net social gain is reflected by 
the area OEF in Figure 5, which is clearly greater than the area OEF minus 
ECH, which would have reflected the net social gain if A is led, in the absence 
of either negotiations or restrictions, to produce OC of the harmful activity. 
If A and B were to negotiate, B would be willing to pay up to the area OCH 
in Figure 5 to induce A to discontinue its activity. A would be willing to accept 
a payment which does not fall below the area DCE to reduce its activity to 
the optimal level OD. A would have been willing to reduce its activity to 
level O in exchange for a payment which does not fall below area ODEF, but 
for this reduction B would not be willing to pay more than ODE. Since B, 
however, is willing to pay more than DCE for a reduction in the activity level 
from OC to OD, the resulting scale of the activity will be the optimal level 
OD as a result of negotiations. 
26 These crit icisms are discussed in more detail in Ronen and McKinney, "Transfer 
Pricing for Divisional Autonomy." 
27 Ibid. 
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If liable to compensate B for actual damages, A will voluntarily choose 
the scale OD at which the marginal loss to B which has to be paid just equals 
A's marginal gain from the harmful activity. By producing at OD, A will have 
to pay B the area ODE, but the total gain would be ODEF and, thus, A's net 
gain is OEF. This net gain will be reduced if A chooses a scale that is either 
higher or lower than OD. Thus, the gain from negotiation is the difference 
between the net social gain with negotiation, which is OEF, and the net social 
gain in the absence of negotiation, which is OEF minus CEH. The net gain 
attributable to negotiation is, therefore, the area CEH. For negotiation to 
be worthwhile from the social standpoint, the cost of negotiation should not 
exceed this gain. If the cost of negotiation exceeds this gain, society would 
be better off with A producing the harmful activity at level OC. If the cost of 
governmental intervention, however, is less than CEH,28 it would be worth-
while for the government to intervene, either through establishing a liability 
for damage or through outright regulation, thus inducing A to reduce its level 
of activity to the optimal scale, OD. Alternatively, the government could 
employ a tax or subsidy system corresponding to that suggested above for 
the transfer-pricing problem. 
If, in the case of negotiations or in the case whereby A is liable to pay 
damages to B, the payment is to be assessed per unit of damage (expressed 
in average rather than marginal terms), then A will have to operate on the 
28 The determination of whether the cost of intervention exceeds or falls below 
the net gain attributable to negotiations is not independent of the type of law that 
prevails. For an elaborate discussion of this issue, see Mishan, "The Postwar 
Literature on Externalities." 
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line AL(B) which is the line average to B's marginal cost line. By facing the 
line AL(B) as its average cost of the activity, A will construct the line marginal 
to it [ML(B)], equate it to the marginal gain, and choose level OD. Similarly, 
B will receive the payment per unit in average terms. B will face the average 
gain curve AG (A) to which will be drawn the marginal MG(A) in Figure 4, 
equate it with the marginal loss line ML(B), and choose activity level OD 
as well. 
A direct translation of this analysis into one appropriate for a transfer-
pricing problem is possible. B can be viewed as transferring an intermediate 
product to A in this case. The intermediate product is B's acceptance of A's 
harmful activity. This acceptance is again assumed to be continuously 
variable. The higher the level of the activity that B accepts, the higher its 
marginal loss and the lower the marginal gain to A. If, in the absence of 
negotiations, the government were to employ a tax-subsidy system corre-
sponding to that suggested for the transfer-pricing problem,29 information 
about the marginal loss to B, ML(B) would be needed. The government 
would provide A with the average schedule AL(B) as the supply curve for the 
acceptance of B; the government would correspondingly be provided by A 
with its marginal gain MG(A), and it would communicate the average gain 
schedule to B as the demand curve for its acceptance. If both A and B 
construct the marginal to these curves and operate on it, both will voluntarily 
and in pursuit of their self-interests choose the optimal level of OD. The total 
receipts of the government from A would be ODLM (see Figure 3). The 
government will pay B a total of ODIJ (see Figure 4), and a net subsidy 
amounting to the difference between the total net gain of A's activity (ODEF) 
and the total loss to B of the activity (ODE) will be paid by the government 
to B. 
Information Requirements. The information requirements for the admin-
istration of such a policy are identical to those arising in the transfer-pricing 
case. Information about the marginal loss and marginal gain resulting from 
the activities should be obtained and communicated. This communication 
should be preferably on a systematic basis since changing factors in the 
environment may affect the loss and the gain curve.30 In the final analysis, 
it can be concluded that accounting must communicate periodically this 
information unless the cost exceeds the benefit. The benefit can be measured 
by the net gain resulting from governmental interference, negotiation, or any 
other social arrangement that becomes desirable as a result of obtaining the 
information. The cost involves estimation of the loss by B and of the gain 
2 9 See Ronen and McKinney, "Transfer Pricing for Divisional Autonomy." 
30 Communicating this information systematically becomes crucial in a changing 
environment, because the cost of obtaining such information under these condit ions 
becomes prohibitive. Thus, in discussing the traditional tax-subsidy solution, Mishan 
argues ("The Postwar Literature on Externalities," p. 15): "The chief obstacle here 
is, of course, the costs of collecting the necessary information and the costs of 
supervision, costs which would be particularly heavy for industries in which demand 
and supply condit ions are apt to vary frequently." 
335 
by A. Since A and B presumably are best qualified to estimate their respec-
tive gain and loss resulting from the activity, it is reasonable to assume that 
this information can be most cheaply provided by them. In particular, a firm 
is in the best position to provide information on (a) its cost of a harmful 
activity caused by another firm and (b) its cost of eliminating or reducing a 
harmful activity which it inflicts on other entities. Certainly, whether, in any 
particular case, the benefit of communicating the information does not ex-
ceed the cost is an empirical question . But the proposition that the benefits 
do exceed the costs in the majority of the cases has great appeal. 
The reported profits of each, A and B (including the subsidy), will be 
identical to the net social gain resulting from B's acceptance of the harmful 
activity. If A ceases the harmful activity or if B does not accept it and has 
the means to enforce its discontinuation, the social product will be reduced 
by the reported profit of either A or B—the area OEF. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
It was shown that, in the situations that are purely defined as external 
economies or diseconomies, the systematic communication of information 
relevant to social costs and benefits is essential for appropriate decisions. 
But the need for systematic reporting of information about social costs 
and benefits is not limited to the cases of pure technical external economies 
or diseconomies. It extends to the broader class of what Scitovsky31 refers to 
as pecuniary external economies. These include the widespread kind of 
interdependencies that are frequently to be found in the analyses of indus-
trialization in developing nations. In these analyses, the concept is used in 
connection with the special problems of allocating savings among alternative 
investment opportunities. These externalities are usually reflected in market 
prices, but they may not lead to optimal allocation of resources until after a 
possibly lengthy period of adjustment. This is particularly true in the case of 
investment projects where the impact of a firm's investment decision on other 
producers will be characterized by a time lag. 
To elaborate, investment in an industry leads to an expansion of its 
capacity and may, thereby, lower the prices of its products and raise the 
prices of the factors used by it. Thus, these results benefit others. The 
raising of factor prices benefits suppliers of the factors. These benefits 
should be explicitly taken into account when investment decisions are made. 
Usually it is recommended that this should be done by taking as a 
maximand not profits alone, but the total of the profits yielded and the pecu-
niary external economies created by the investment.32 
This naturally conflicts with the results of equilibrium theory. According 
to the latter, market interdependence as a competitive system insures that 
the maximization of profit by each firm and the maximization of satisfaction 
31 T. Scitovsky, "Two Concepts of External Economies," Journal of Political Econ-
omy, LXII (April 1954), pp. 70-82. 
32 Ibid. 
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by each individual lead to an optimum situation where consumers' and pro-
ducers' surpluses are maximized. This paradox can only be resolved by 
recognizing that the limitation of general equilibrium theory renders it in-
applicable to the problems of investments which are typically long-run. 
The first reason for such a failure is an unrealistic assumption of divisi-
bility when large investment projects are undertaken, e.g., investment in 
public utilities such as canal zones, bridges, and railways—the typical 
examples of indivisibilities in economies which would force the producer to 
choose to produce either less or more than the output that would equate 
these marginal costs and benefits. 
Another reason for the inapplicability of general equilibrium to the 
problems of investment is the fact that equilibrium theory is static, whereas 
the allocation of investment funds is dynamic. Equilibrium theory assures 
the socially desirable optimum only when the system is in equilibrium. In-
vestments need not bring the system closer to equilibrium; when they do 
not, the result of equilibrium theory may not apply. Profits themselves are a 
sign of disequilibrium, and investment is undertaken for profit. Profits in a 
freely competitive industry lead to investment in that industry, and the invest-
ment in turn tends to eliminate the profits that have called it forth. The same 
investment, however, may induce profits in other industries, and to this extent 
it leads away from equilibrium. Thus, investment in Industry A will cheapen 
its product, and if this is used as a factor in Industry B, the latter's profits 
will increase. This is a case where the price reduction creates not a con-
sumer surplus proper, but a pecuniary external economy which benefits firms. 
The profits of Industry B created by the lower price factor A call for investment 
expansion in B, which in turn would increase Industry B's demand for In-
dustry A's products. This again will give rise to profits and call for further 
investment and expansion in Industry A. Equilibrium is reached only when 
successive doses of investment and expansion in the two industries have 
led to the simultaneous elimination of profits in both. Only then will the 
conclusions of equilibrium theory become applicable and thus, in the absence 
of direct interdependence, the amount of investment possible in Industry A 
would also be the socially desirable amount. This is greater than the amount 
which was profitable at the first stage before Industry B has made adjustments. 
Thus, in general, when an investment gives rise to pecuniary external 
economies, its private profitability understates its social desirability. Only 
when the pecuniary external economy created by investment in Industry A 
becomes "internal," and part of the profits of the investors themselves, will 
investment in A be more profitable and will, thus, be pushed further than 
in the absence of integration, but even then, without investment and expan-
sion in Industry B, it would not be pushed far enough. What inhibits the 
investment in A is, among other things, a limitation of the demand for Industry 
A's products imposed by the limited capacity of Industry B which consumes 
this product, just as investment in Industry B is inhibited by the limited 
capacity of Industry A, the supplier of one of Industry B's factors of production. 
Only the expansion in the two industries, integrated and planned to-
gether with the possibility of investment in each one of them, would be a 
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reliable index of its social desirability. Moreover, it is apparent that vertical 
integration alone would not be sufficient. Complete integration of all indus-
tries (considering all possible instances of pecuniary external economies) 
would be necessary to eliminate all divergence between private profit and 
public benefit. 
Profits in a market economy could thus be a poor guide to economic 
outcome as far as investment and industrial expansion are concerned, and 
the more decentralized and differentiated the economy, the poorer they are 
as a guide. 
In an economy in which economic decisions are decentralized, a system 
of communications is needed to facilitate the coordination of economic deci-
sions. Prices in a market are generally the signalling device that provides 
information concerning economic decisions. The merit of perfect competition 
is that it would cause prices to transmit information reliably and to induce 
people to respond to this information properly. Market prices, however, 
can be deficient in reflecting the economic situation as it will be in the future. 
They are thus more useful for coordinating current production decisions that 
are immediately effective and guided by short-run consideration than they 
are for coordinating investment decisions that have a delayed effect and that 
in the long run should be governed not by what the present economic situa-
tion is, but by what the future economic situation is expected to be. 
The proper coordination of investment decisions would require, there-
fore, a signalling device to transmit information about present plans and 
future conditions as they are determined by present plans—i.e., forecasts 
made by those who decide on present plans. The pricing system fails to 
provide this information (except in the case where there exists a developed 
futures market, so that future prices could provide exactly such a signalling 
device). In these cases, therefore, there is need either for centralized invest-
ment planning or—in the absence of centralized planning when decentrali-
zation is considered desirable and superior—for some additional communi-
cation system to supplement the pricing system as a signalling device. 
Where should such a signalling device come from? If it is considered 
that a systematic, periodic, and reliable communication system is desirable, 
then the most appropriate way of providing such signals is through the 
accounting information system. It is desirable for a producer, in pursuing 
maximum profits, to attempt to provide the best forecast information that 
bears upon the effect of present investment plans that may induce other in-
vestors to react in a manner which is optimal from a social point of view 
as well as from the standpoint of the producer's private, long-run goal. If a 
producer has to communicate these signals in the absence of a systematic 
information system, two problems may arise. The first is whether the pro-
ducer, given the time and the information overload pressure at the moment 
of the decision, and given the daily problems of production, would devote 
sufficient efforts to such a disclosure. The second problem which arises 
deals with the economies of information. Even assuming that the manager 
will pay sufficient attention to the signalling of estimated future effects, would 
the cost of ad hoc, spur-of-the-moment reporting not exceed the cost of 
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providing relevant information periodically and systematically through the 
accounting system? Obviously, this is an empirical issue which cannot be 
settled in general, one way or the other. In any particular instance, however, 
or for any particular firm, it may not be impossible to ascertain the cost/ 
benefit relationship so that a determination can be made whether these sig-
nals should be detected and communicated in an ad hoc fashion or on a 
systematic basis. 
It seems, therefore, appropriate that the objective of accounting systems 
should give explicit consideration to providing signals made necessary by 
the existence of pecuniary external economies or diseconomies whenever 
such provision within the accounting system is desirable from a cost/benefit 
standpoint. Explicit consideration of the desirability of incorporating the 
signalling function within the accounting system seems superior to leaving 
such signals to chance or to reliance on the belief that the inherent rationality 
of managers will ensure not only a sufficient amount of attention on an ad 
hoc basis, but also an optimal search for such signals on an ad hoc basis. 
Thus, if such signalling devices are present, investment decisions which 
exclude the signalling of possible future effects may be suboptimal and less 
than would have been socially desirable. If signals are given, producers 
affected by pecuniary externalities will adjust to the expected effects of such 
investments and probably expand their facilities and generate the expanded 
demand for the other industry's product, thus causing the chain of expanded 
investment in the other industry and shortening the period of disequilibrium 
during which the suboptimality persists. 
Summary 
/ Social costs are incurred when actions of business firms have harmful 
effects on others. Social benefits accrue when actions of business firms 
benefit others. When actions like these and their effects on others manifest 
themselves in the market prices of the goods and services provided by the 
business firms, they become part of the private costs and benefits. In this 
case, the social effects of such actions (that manifest themselves in market 
prices of goods and services) need not be considered separately in the 
formulation of accounting objectives. 
As is often the case, however, social costs and benefits are not imme-
diately reflected in the market prices of the goods and services transferred 
among business firms or to consumers. An explicit and separate considera-
tion of social costs and benefits (not manifested in market prices) becomes 
justified. Such an explicit consideration is necessary for the private parties 
concerned to assess the situation correctly and arrive at an optimal solution. 
However, in many cases more than two parties are involved in activities 
causing social costs. In these instances it can be too costly for the parties 
to come together to agree or bargain, and governmental intervention (through 
fixing liability for damages, placing taxes or outright regulation) may become 
appropriate. Whatever social arrangement is deemed best under the circum-
stances, however, periodic and systematic information about social costs is 
necessary for the government to effect a desirable and rational policy and 
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for business firms to be able to anticipate and help shape this policy. Prob-
ably, the most appropriate and inexpensive source for such information is 
the accounting system. 
Thus, when government does not have to intervene, accounting informa-
tion should reflect the social costs as part of the cost of production in such 
a way that the resulting income properly reflects the quality of management 
performance. By incorporating social costs explicitly in accounting reports, 
stockholders and creditors will be more qualified to assess managerial per-
formance inasmuch as the choice of alternative actions within the firm is 
concerned. Such costs must also be explicitly incorporated in accounting 
reports to properly reflect the firm's contribution to the social product. This 
is necessary from a social standpoint just as it is considered necessary for 
a division of a decentralized firm to reflect its contribution to the firm's overall 
profit in order to satisfy the decision needs of central management. 
The periodic communication of social costs is also necessary when 
intervention by the government may be desirable to effectively carry out its 
responsibility. Although many of these costs are difficult to quantify, the 
main question is whether omitting attempts to measure them within the ac-
counting framework can be justified. These social costs and benefits which 
are important to users such as management, stockholders, and government 
will continue to be implicitly, if not explicitly, quantified. Incorporation of 
these costs and benefits within the accounting framework will obviously 
represent an improvement. 
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